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illustrates that a preference for the non-degraded action (Con) clearly emerged over time as 48 people were exposed to the differences between each AO contingency. Figure 2B (left panel) shows that 49 overall the mean number of Con actions was greater than the degraded actions (Deg). Causal ratings 50 collected at the end of each two minute block also confirmed people judged the Con action more causal 51 than the Deg action, shown in Figure 2C (left panel). Substantial evidence exists that the ventral striatum tracks or receives reward prediction-errors, [18] [19] [20] while dorsal striatal regions track action values. 18 In the present example of AO learning, the prediction-error 160 represents the deviations between the observed outcome and the summed total causal expectancy (action 161 + background). We tested whether the striatum tracks this summed error term, by including it as a 162 parametric modulator in an anatomical ROI analysis of the striatum. Figure 5C & 5D shows BOLD responses 163 in a posterior region of the caudate body (green) tracked the summed errors (ROI peak MNI: : +15 +11 +4, Z 164 = 4.17, t 29 = 4.94, FWE = .002 svc) while activity in the anterior caudate (red) was associated with the 165 covariance between actions and background (ROI peak MNI: -15 +23 +7, Z = 3.42, t 29 = 3.84, FWE = .029 svc) 166 These regions were more medial and dorsal than those implicated in reward prediction-error signals but 167 similar to regions implicated in instrumental learning. 18 Thus, the caudate appears to receive sufficient 168 information to segregate the influence of different events and may play an important role in selectively 169 distinguishing causal actions from background effects. 170 DCM revealed the caudate segregates the effect of the action from background effects 171 To further determine the caudate's role in distinguishing control, we performed a dynamic causal model 172 (DCM) analysis. 21 We tested two possibilities shown in Figure 5E & 5F. In Model 1 the caudate is a site of 173 convergence of the updated values from the prefrontal cortex to enable action-selection. In Model 2 the 174 caudate segregates the prediction-error to update the estimates of the action and background separately. 175 Bayesian model selection revealed the relative log-evidence for model 2 was 85.31, which corresponds to 176 strong evidence in favor of segregation. A random-effects analysis ( Figure 5G & 5H) revealed a large 177 majority of participants were significantly more consistent with the segregate model than the integration 178 model (the exceedance probability was 99 percent), and it was more likely to be true for any random 179 subject (the posterior probability of the segregate model was 80 percent).
180
PPI showed cortex and caudate interact when causal actions must be distinguished by their covariance 181 Experiment 2 replicated the key fMRI results in an independent sample of naive participants, using a design 182 that allowed us to assess the effect of distinguishing the free outcomes on the corticostriatal network we 183 identified above. The experiment used a single AO contingency and varied whether or not the free 184 outcomes were distinguishable from the earned outcomes in a block-by-block fashion, to test the interaction between causality and caudate activity. For half the blocks we used the same outcome for both 186 free and earned outcomes (i.e., as in Experiment 1), while in the other half the earned outcomes were 187 different from the free outcomes. Using distinct outcomes in half the blocks allowed the participant to 188 discern the causal effect of their actions (i.e., equivalent to signaling the free outcomes, as in the follow-up 189 to Experiment 1). Figure 6A shows that degradation reduced total actions and causal ratings, however 190 providing distinct free outcomes restored causal actions and judgments. As before, we fitted the Kalman 191 algorithm to the data using maximum likelihood estimation. The optimal model predicted significantly 192 more choices than chance, the mean group average likelihood per trial was 57 percent (95% CI: 53-60). A 193 functional ROI (fROI) analysis using masks generated from the significant results in the mPFC and caudate of Figure 6C , violet), ROI peak MNI: -2 +47 +46, Z = 3.04, 197 t 19 = 3.56, p = .001. Covariance between the action and background was tracked in the caudate ( Figure 6C , 198 right), ROI peak MNI: -12 +20 +1, Z = 3.91, t 19 = 5.01, FWE = .002. We used a whole-brain PPI analysis to 199 determine whether any cortical regions interacted with the caudate when free outcomes were 200 indistinguishable from earned outcomes. A single region in the right parietal junction interacted with the 201 caudate when free outcomes were the same (versus different), shown in Figure 6E We sought to establish the learning rules that govern AO learning in instrumental conditioning and their 208 neural bases. We found that the medial prefrontal cortex participates in a circuit that detects and a summed prediction-error term along with the covariance between potential causes to distinguish the 212 unique effect of actions from background effects. Furthermore, the caudate appears to be a key point of 213 integration of the covariance term and prediction-error; it segregates the summed prediction-error into 214 separate update values for each causal belief. Thus, this model represents a simple, iterative Bayesian 215 model of change, that unlike other computational-level models, 22 provides an algorithmic account of AO 216 learning that can be instantiated in the neural code. 23 
217
Many results have emphasized the critical role of the medial prefrontal cortex in AO learning, however the 218 exact nature of this role has been unspecified. Indeed, there is a wealth of evidence that in the rat, the 
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Our results also distinguished a separate region of the mPFC, near the medial surface of BA9, whose activity 232 represented updates to the unique effect of the action (∆AO) and replicated the involvement of the mPFC 233 in an independent sample, highlighting the reliability of the current findings ( Figure 6C ). We further showed 234 using PPI ( Figure 6D & E) that the caudate interacts with the parietal cortex when free outcomes are 235 indistinguishable from the earned outcome (i.e., when there was no signal or the free outcome was the 236 same as the earned outcome). The selective interaction between parietal cortex and caudate arises under 237 the additional demands when there is no observable information to distinguish control. When noncontingent outcomes are indistinguishable, the covariance between our actions and the background is 239 the only information that can be used to distinguish them. The right posterior parietal junction identified in 240 the PPI was the same cortical region identified in Experiment 1 as tracking the covariance term (along with 241 the caudate in the subcortex). It also overlaps with the cortical region previously implicated in learning the 242 transition matrix during model-based reinforcement learning, 30 suggesting, across studies and laboratories, 243 that this region represents the covariance structure of the environment. While PPI does not indicate the 244 direction of influence, these results are consistent with a network extending from the parietal cortex to 245 caudate to mPFC, which tracks the covariance between actions and other events and then segregates the 246 error-term to learn about and distinguish between the influence of different causes. 247 We found the competitive allocation of causal belief to actions relative to the background is a form of 248 selective learning closely related to cue-competition models in associative learning. 8 These results also make an important contribution to the common claim that goal-directed learning is 258 analogous to MBRL. In general, MBRL is concerned with building a model of the environment, given the 259 state caused by each action (i.e., the covariance or transition matrix). In such models, "state prediction- learning is not concerned with the transition probabilities between different states, but rather the trade-263 offs between competing contingencies to determine whether that state was cause by an action or not. This 264 is a primary difference between causal models and MBRL. The question of which action caused which state is arguably more fundamental to goal-directed learning. For example, the prediction-errors we observed 266 here are critically different from "state prediction-errors" because they are adjusted for the probability that of an outcome while holding ∆P constant modulates causal judgements (e.g., "the base-rate illusion").
276
However the base-rate illusion is considerably weaker in free-response, instrumental learning where trials 277 are not explicitly segmented. [33] [34] [35] [36] Furthermore, when learning about causal effects, active intervention is a 278 more reliable guide to causal relations than is sheer observation, largely because actions constitute one 279 basic way to control for possible alternative causes. [37] [38] [39] [40] Humans are able to reason suppositionally or 280 counterfactually about what would be expected to happen if an intervention is made or not made, and 281 midbrain dopamine neuron firing 41 along with our Bayesian model reflects these counterfactual action 282 values. For these reasons, AO learning may not suffer the same biases as other forms of causal learning that 283 are based on passive observation.
284
In conclusion, learning about the causal effects of our actions, as required for goal-directed learning and as 285 investigated here, appears to reflect features of traditional associative models such as competition for 286 predictive value, as well as modern conventions such as environmental structure (covariance). In our hands, 287 these features were combined in a highly simplified, iterative Kalman filter that learned a probability with growing evidence that the brain learns and make decisions on the basis of probability 
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AO contingency degradation task. 308 In each experiment, participants were instructed not to eat three hours prior the appointment. Pre-testing 309 involved obtaining preference ratings on a 7-point scale for each of three snacks (M&Ms, BBQ flavored 310 crackers, chocolate cookies), from which the two most similarly preferred snacks were selected for the 311 experiment.
312
Experiment 1 involved learning two AO contingencies concurrently. Participants were instructed they could 313 liberate snack foods (BBQ flavored crackers and M&Ms) from a vending machine by tilting it to the left or 314 right (by pressing either a left or right button), and that sometimes the vending machine would also release 315 a snack for free. They were also instructed to find the best action for releasing snacks. Outcomes were 316 indicated by the presentation of a visual stimulus depicting the snack for 1-s duration ( a particular snack 317 food, e.g., M&M or BBQ cracker), during which further outcomes could not be earned. The relationship between actions and outcomes were constant across blocks for each participant (e.g., left = M&M and right = BBQ crackers for all blocks). Each block lasted 120-s, and the software controlling the task PsychoPy2 320 v1.8, 45, 46 divided each block into 120 one-second intervals to determine the outcome rate. Participants 321 were unaware of the 1-s intervals, and they responded freely using the index finger on their right hand to 322 press the left or right button on a Lumina MRI-compatible response pad (LU-400, Cedrus Corporation, CA). 323 An action (tilt left or tilt right) earned a particular outcome with a probability P = 0.2 if that action had 324 occurred in the preceding 1-s interval. If both actions occurred in the preceding interval then only the most 325 recent action was considered for reinforcement. A free outcome was delivered with P = 0.2 if neither action 326 had been made. This schedule ensured two important features: 1) that there was no serendipitous 327 contingency between an action and a free outcome, which would result in a higher reward contingency for 328 the contingent action 16 , and 2) the earned outcome appeared at a varying interval up to one second after a 329 successful action, which is sufficient to introduce ambiguity into the perceived AO contingency. 47 
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Participants completed six blocks; the outcome (BBQ cracker or M&M) that was subject to contingency 331 degradation was counterbalanced across blocks (ABBAAB). At the end of each block, participants rated how 332 causal each action was with respect to each outcome on a Likert scale from 1 (not at all) to 7 (very causal). was the same snack or a different snack as the earned outcome in each block, in an ABBA order. In half the where ! is a free parameter controlling the learning rate. In this way, the model replicates the prediction- The mean (errorbars SEM) percent of contingent actions was significantly greater than degraded actions when free outcomes were unsignalled, paired t-test t29 = 4.15, ***p = .0002. However when free outcomes were signalled then degraded actions were restored, paired t-test t29 = 0.75, p = .46. C) Mean (errorbars SEM) causal judgments of the contingent action were greater than the degraded action when free outcomes were unsignalled, paired t-test t29 = 3.94, ***p < .0004, and this difference was removed when the free outcomes were signalled, paired t-test t29 = 0.88, p = .39. Under a degradation schedule, belief in the action and background initially increase together as actions co-occur with outcomes. However with free outcomes, the belief in the background diverges from the action. B) Changes in the background and action occur in the same direction when covariance between the action and background is positive, but when the covariance is negative then beliefs move in opposite directions. C) Action and outcome events over time in this example Mean (errorbar SEM) total responses were signficantly higher when the free outcomes were different from earned outcomes, outcome main effect F1,19 = 12.57, p = .02. This difference decreased as ∆P increased, outcome by contingency interaction F1.5,38 = 7.24, p = .005. B) Mean (errorbar SEM) causal judgments were higher when free outcomes were different from earned outcomes (F1,19 = 33.82, p = .6E-4) and this difference decreased as ∆P increased, interaction F2,38 = 10.07, p = .002. C) Updates to the action ∆AO occurred in the BA9 fROI (violet, image threshold p < .001 svc) while updates to the background ∆XO occurred in the dorsal ACC fROI (blue, image threshold p < .001 svc) and the covariance was tracked in the caudate fROI (green, image threshold p < .001 svc). D) Illustrative results from a single subject showing the caudate and posterior parietal cortex interacted with the causal condition E) Right parietal junction activity interacted with caudate activity when noncontingent outcomes were indistinguishable from contingent outcomes (covariance from Experiment 1 shown in red for comparison), image thresold p < .001 unc. 
